I, Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim, (NRIC 470810-07-5095), a Malaysian Citizen and of full age, presently being detained at the Sungei Buloh Prison, Selangor, hereby affirm and say as follows:-

1. Unless otherwise stated, the facts deposed to herein are within my knowledge. 

2. I was charged in the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur on the 29 September 1998 with 9 offences, 5 under section 2 of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No.22 of 1970, and the rest under section 377B of the Penal Code. 

3. On the 30th day of September 1998, I was charged in the Sessions Court at Petaling Jaya with 1 further offence under section 377B of the Penal Code. 

4. On the application of the Attorney-General, the trial of the offences were transferred to the Criminal Division of the High Court at Kuala Lumpur. 

5. I am presently being tried by Justice Augustine Paul (hereinafter referred to as "the learned Judge") in the High Court (Criminal Division) at Kuala Lumpur on 4 of those charges. 

6. The trial (hereinafter referred to as "the Trial") commenced on the 2nd day of November 1998 and is on-going. 

7. The lst and 3rd Charges, which are identical except in relation to the references to the persons from whom the "written confessions" were alleged to have been obtained, read:- 

"That you from Aug.12 1997 to Aug.18, 1997, at the official residence of the Deputy Prime Minister, No.…., while being a member of the administration, that is, being the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, had committed corrupt practice where you had directed Datuk Mohd Said Awang, Special Branch director, and Amir Junus, Special Branch deputy director II, to obtain a written confession from Azizan Abu Bakar/Ummi Hafilda Ali to deny sexual misconduct and sodomy committed by you for the purpose of protecting youself from any criminal action or proceedings, and as a result Azizan Abu Bakar/Ummi Hafilda gave a written confession dated Aug.18, 1997 to the Prime Minister as directed, and therefore you have committed an offence punishable under section 2(1) Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No.22 of 1970." 

8. The 2nd and 4th Charges, which are identical except in relation to the references to the persons who are alleged to have given the "public written statements", read:-

"That you on Aug 27, 1997, at the official residence of the Deputy Prime Minister, No….., while being a member of the administration, that is, being the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, had committed corrupt practice where you directed Datuk Mohd Said Awang, Special Branch director, and Amir Junus, Special Branch deputy director, to urge Azizan Abu Bakar/Ummi Hafilda Ali to give a written public statement to deny sexual misconduct and sodomy committed by you for the purpose of protecting yourself from any criminal action or proceedings and as a result Azizan Abu gave a public written statement as ordered, and therefore you have committed an offence punishable under section 2(1) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No.22 of 1970".

i. that in exchange for a reduction of the present charge to one under the Arms Act he [Dato Gani] wanted Nallakarrupan to co-operate with them and to give information against Anwar Ibrahim, specifically on matters concerning several married women. Dato Gani kept changing the number and finally settled on five, three married and two unmarried. 

ii. That he would expect Nallakarupan to testify against Anwar in respect of these woman." 

e. Dato Gani Patail and Encik Azahar bin Mohamed (who was also named in the Statutory), being then the most senior members of the team of prosecution in the Trial, and on the advice of Counsel, which I verily believed, that it was as much the duty of any prosecutor as it is that of a Judge to discharge his duties fairly and impartially, I did not believe that it was in the best interest of justice for them to continue to be part of the team of prosecutors in the Trial, having regard to the way they had conducted themselves in trying to implicate me with having committed offences by getting Datuk Nallakarrupan to fabricate evidence according to the Statutory Declaration. 

f. Having taken a highly unprofessional and personal interest to secure my conviction at all costs, their involvement in the Trial had already raised grave doubts as to the integrity of the evidence which had been adduced against me by the prosecution witnesses and their continuing to be prosecutors in the Trial would pervert the administration of justice and would result in a travesty of justice. 

g. The application to disqualify Dato Gani Patail and Encik Azahar Mohamed was filed by the firm of one of my Counsel in the Trial, Zainur Zakaria. 

h. It was fixed for hearing for the 30th day of November 1998, the first working day after it was filed. 

i. When it came up for hearing, the learned Judge, instead of hearing Counsel, Raja Aziz Addruse, on the application, called upon Zainur Zakaria to answer various questions put to him by the learned Judge, the gist of which was whether Zainur would assume full responsibility for filing the application, whether Zainur was aware of the law relating to accomplices and of the discretion of the Attorney-General to reduce or not reduce a charge, saying that 
"It is very clear that the Attorney-General has the power to ask a prisoner whether he will give information that an offence has been committed. It is practised in every civilised country. It is practised in the UK and almost everywhere else. Without this, it is impossible to get certain criminals",

and whether Zainur was satisfied that there was evidence of allegations of fabrication of evidence made in the Statutory Declaration.

j. When Zainur replied that, from the documents he and my other counsel had come to the conclusion that there was, the Judge held that the application, with its affidavit-in-support, was an interference with the course of justice as it had no basis; that it amounted to pre-emptive step to undermine the integrity of a trial in progress; that its objective to project an impression that the prosecution was anchored on fabricated evidence and was a serious contempt. 

k. The learned Judge went on to say that he had to act with all urgency to preserve the integrity of the Trial; that he would not hesitate to flex every inch of his judicial muscle to ensure that the Trial proceeded smoothly; that it was his duty to guarantee that those following the Trial were not hoodwinked in any way; and that in the light of the baseless application filed by Zainur, the learned Judge proposed to cite him in contempt for having attempted to undermine the integrity of the Trial; but that he would, however, show mercy by dropping further proceedings if Zainur tendered an unconditional apology to the court and to the Attorney-General, Dato Abdul Gani Patail and Encik Azahar Mohamed for filing a baseless application "which is an abuse of the process of the court." (The SUN, 1/12/98) 

l. Zainur was given time to consider whether to apologise or be cited for contempt. 

m. When Zainur informed the court some 40 minutes later (when the court resumed hearing), that he was unable to tender the apology asked for by the learned Judge, the learned Judge preferred a charge against him by calling upon him to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for filing an application supported by an affidavit and documents containing "scandalous and contemptuous allegations". 

n. When Zainur subsequently, in showing cause, stated on oath that he filed the application upon the instruction of his client, namely myself, and that he did so in the discharge of his duty as an advocate and solicitor which is provided for not only by the common law but by the provisions of the Legal Profession Act 1976, a duty to be exercised without fear or favour, the learned Judge, rejecting an application made by Zainur's counsel for time to be given time to call witnesses to prove whether the allegations said to be scandalous were, in fact, true, found the allegations baseless and Zainur's explanations to be without merit, and deserved no consideration. 

o. Zainur was found to have committed contempt of court and sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment. Zainur has filed an appeal against the finding of contempt and sentence. Pending the hearing of the appeal the execution of the sentence has been stayed by the Court of Appeal. 

p. An account of the proceedings and the text of the Statutory Declaration and the letter to the Attorney-General hereinbefore referred to are published in the SUN newspaper dated the 1st December 1998. 

q. Arising from the finding of contempt made against Zainur, the learned Judge, on the application of the Attorney-General, issued a warrant of arrest against Manjeet Singh, requiring him to appear before the learned Judge to show cause why he, too, should not be committed for contempt. 

r. Manjeet Singh appeared before the court a few days later and, upon his explanating that the Statutory Declaration was made public without his approval and tendering an apology for causing any inconvenience caused thereby, the learned Judge took no further action against him and dismissed my application to disqualify Dato Abdul Ghani Patail and Encik Azahar Mohamed, without hearing Counsel who was to move the application on my behalf.. 

s. I am advised by Counsel that the learned Judge acted contrary to established principles of natural justice in so dismissing the application and I have caused an appeal to be filed against the dismissal. The appeal is pending. 

2. Rulings on Hearsay Evidence
 

a. While testifying in the Trial, I referred to a meeting I had with the Prime Minister in which he had given me an ultimatum to either resign from his Cabinet posts or be charged in court. 

b. The learned Judge, without any objection having been taken by the prosecution, questioned the admissibility of the statement made by the Prime Minister (giving the ultimatum) on the ground that it was hearsay and citing an authority in support of his view. The statement, according to the learned Judge, could not be admitted unless the defence called and questioned the Prime Minister as a witness. 

c. On the same ground, the admissibility of a statement of the Inspector-General of Police made directly to me was also questioned by the learned Judge. 

d. The learned Judge, however, agreed to defer making a ruling in order that the legal position could be fully argued and ordered the press not to publish any of the statements made by the Prime Minister and the Inspector General of Police in the meantime. (NST, 11/2/99). 

e. But, having made that ruling with respect to the statements of the Prime Minister and the Inspector-General of Police, the learned Judge subsequently admitted the "double hearsay" evidence of a defence witness, Ma'amin bin Latip, which, I am advised and verily believe, is more objectionable from the legal point of view. In dismissing Counsel's objection to the admissibility of the evidence, the learned Judge observed:- 

9. In the way the charges were framed, I was advised by Counsel and verily believed that one of the main ingredients which the prosecution had to prove was the truthfulness of the allegations of sexual misconduct and sodomy said to have been committed by me.
From the very beginning, therefore, my defence was:- 

a. that the allegations were baseless and false and that there was, therefore, no question of my having to protect myself from any criminal action or proceedings on the basis of such allegations; 

b. that there was a conspiracy by my political opponents to get me charged in 1998 on the basis of the same allegations which, in 1997, had been publicly denounced as being baseless and false by no less than the Prime Minister himself and by the then Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahim Noor. As late as April 1998, the Attorney-General’s opinion on the allegations was made known to Parliament by the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department in a statement on the 1st day of April 1998, that the Attorney General was satisfied that there was no truth in the allegations and that investigations into the matter had been closed; 

c. that the revival of police investigations in 1998 and my prosecution had been the result of a conspiracy by the authorities to frame me with the various charges and others yet to be disclosed, which conspiracy Counsel had, for convenience, loosely termed as "police conspiracy". 

10. The prosecution sought to establish that the allegations were true through a number of their witnesses:- 

a. PW.1 and PW.11, the director and deputy director, respectively, of the Special Branch, testified that they believed the allegations to be true on the basis of reports they had received from PW.2 and PW.7 (officers in the Special Branch) of their preliminary investigations on Azizan Abu Bakar and Ummi Hafilda Ali. PW.2 and PW.7 testified on how they themselves came to believe the allegations to be true; 

b. .PW.21, the Government Chemist gave evidence that he had carried out DNA and other tests and had concluded that some of the 13 stains found on a mattress, taken from an apartment in Bangsar, had my sperm and vaginal fluid of one Shamsidar Taharin. 

9. That there was no firm basis for PW.1’s and PW.11’s belief was established in the cross-examination of PW.2 and PW.7. I was advised by Counsel and verily believed that, in any case, such belief had little evidential value for the purpose of the ingredients of the charges. 

10. In cross-examination, PW.21 was shown to have been unjustified in many of his findings. He admitted to making a number of unwarranted assumptions in coming to his conclusions. 

11. When it became clear to them that they were unable to prove the truthfulness of the allegations, the prosecution applied to amend the charges at the close of the prosecution case. 

12. In the amended 1st Charge, the words beginning with "a written confession…", to the end of the original Charge were replaced by:- 

"to obtain a written statement from Azizan Abu Bakar addressed to YAB Prime Minister denying his allegation of sodomy as contained in his Pengakuan Bersumpah dated Aug.5 1997, for your advantage, to wit, to save youself from embarrassment, and you have therefore committed an offence punishable under section 2(1), Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No.22 of 1970."

13. The amended 3rd Charge was identical to the 1st except only that the allegations were of sexual misconduct and sodomy and were made by Ummi Hafilda in a confidential report. 

14. The 2nd Charge replaced all the words from "to urge Azizan bin Abu Bakar…", appearing in the original Charge with the following:- 

"to obtain a written statement from Azizan Abu Bakar to YAB Prime Minister denying his allegation of sodomy…., which they obtained as directed, in the form of a Kenyataan Umum, for your advantage, to wit, for the purpose of protecting yourself against any criminal action, and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under section 2(1) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No.22 of 1970".

15. The amended 4th Charge was identical to the 2nd except only that the allegations were of sexual misconduct and sodomy and were made by Ummi Hafilda in a confidential report. 

16. In spite of the fact that a lot of evidence with respect to allegation of sexual misconduct and sodomy (which was highly prejudicial to me) had been allowed to be admitted and such evidence had, by reason of the wide publicity given to it both in this country and overseas, tarnished my name and reputation, and in spite of strenuous objections raised on my behalf that the prosecution's purpose in making the amendments was to lighten the onus of proof cast on them under the original 
4 Charges, the learned Judge allowed the amendments to the Charges, holding that the amendments would not cause me any prejudice as it would still be for the court to rule out any irrelevant evidence already admitted. 

17. The learned Judge gave the following reason for allowing the amendments: 
"After reading the new charges for an hour, I found that the elements are still the same. The major change if any refers to the commission of sexual misconduct and sodomy, which on the reading of the old charges, is not really a substantive element." (The SUN, 14/1/99).

18. He said that unlike the original charges, which had referred to sexual misconduct and sodomy and sodomy committed by me:- 
"The amended charges do not say so, but only refer to the allegations. This does not bring into focus their truth and/or falsity which, therefore, does not become a constituent element of the charges. Therefore, the truth or falsity becomes irrelevant." (The SUN, 15/1/99).

19. The learned Judge, therefore, ruled that all evidence given by the prosecution witnesses on alleged sexual misconduct and sodomy committed by me became irrelevant and ordered such evidence to be expunged from the court's records and not to be considered by both parties, in order to prevent prejudice to me. 

20. This included the evidence of PW.21 (the Government Chemist), the evidence of Azizan Abu Bakar given in cross-examination, in so far as it pertained to the truth of the allegations, and the evidence of the Kuala Lumpur Hospital forensic specialist, Dr. Zahari Noor who had said that his medical examination showed that Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja had not been sodomised, as well as that of any other witness who had testified on the question of sexual misconduct or sodomy having been committed by me. 

21. The learned Judge expunged the evidence without any application having been made in that behalf by either the prosecution or the defence. 

22. When replying to the defence submission of No Case to Answer subsequently made to the learned Judge, Dato Abdul Gani Patail himself indicated that he was against the evidence being expunged. 

23. The evidence expunged was crucial to the defence case and, as respect the original 4 Charges, was favourable to the defence. Expunging it from the records, far from avoiding prejudice to me, was, in fact, to the prejudice of my case and could not possibly be in the interest of justice. 

24. I am advised by Counsel and verily believe that they have not been able to trace a criminal case decided in this country where a court had expunged evidence adduced during a trial, upon its allowing a charge or charges to be amended. 

25. On the 31st day of January 1998, just before I gave evidence (pursuant to the learned Judge's ruling that I be called to make my defence), the learned Judge again ordered the parties to stay clear of the sex allegations when adducing evidence at the defence stage, saying that it was necessary to say a few words to guide the conduct of the case as both sides had touched on the truth of the allegations. He reiterated that 

"It is to be noted that the amended charges merely refer to allegations of sodomy and sexual misconduct and not to the actual commission of it. The truth or falsity of the allegations are therefore not an issue in this trial. Any evidence or argument that has or is to be directed on this matter is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible." (The SUN, 1/2/99)

26. This must be the first case tried in a criminal court in this country where the court does not consider the truth of allegations relevant to the issue of guilt and where it does not seem to be interested in ascertaining the truth. 

27. In spite of his holding that the elements of the amended Charges were still the same as under the original Charges, it has since become very apparent that the learned Judge is precluding the defence from adducing evidence important to establishing the defence case on the ground that such evidence is not relevant to the ingredients of the amended Charges. Even evidence going to the issue of the credibility of either Azizan Abu Bakar or Ummi Hafilda has been held to be irrelevant because that would tend to show their allegations not to be true, and has been held not to be admissible by virtue of the ruling already made: the fact that the allegations have been made by Azizan and Ummi is, according to the learned Judge, no longer in issue. Argument by Counsel that the credibility of those witnesses with respect to their testimony in the Trial is a relevant issue has not found favour with the learned Judge. 

28. The defence of "political conspiracy" originally permitted by the learned Judge to be raised was subsequently held to be also irrelevant. Counsel was stopped from questioning me on the existence of a political conspiracy against me even in 1997 (which I was informed of by PW.1 and PW.11 at the time), saying:- 

"Evidence may be adduced to show conspiracy by the police to change their stand or create evidence against the accused, and no further. Political conspiracy against the accused, if any, is irrelevant." (NST, 10/2/99)

29. The contention of Counsel that the political conspiracy had been the cause of pw.1's and PW.11's becoming hostile towards me in 1998 was, therefore, held by the learned Judge to be irrelevant. (NST, 11/2/99) 

30. On the question of conspiracy by the police, too, the learned Judge subsequently ruled that any evidence to be adduced by the defence was to be confined to matters of the possibility of my being charged, and nothing else. The manner in which my arrest was effected and what had happened whilst I was in police custody, although tending to show the change in the attitude of the police towards me in 1998 when compared with their attitude in 1997, was ruled to be irrelevant. As a result, the evidence of two doctors, to show that I had been assaulted by the police on the first night of my arrest, and the extent of the injuries suffered, was not allowed to be adduced. (The SUN, 5/3/99) 

31. On the question of relevancy of evidence, the learned Judge has ruled that the defence must first show the relevancy of calling every witness by providing the court with a summary of their testimony. In the case of Manjeet Singh Dillon, a defence witness in the course of being examined-in-chief, Counsel was required to give orally a summary of the evidence to be adduced, the learned Judge stating that he would prohibit evidence to be adduced if he was not satisfied with the explanation of Counsel on the matter of relevancy (The Sun, 4/3/99). On the 11th day of March 1999, a summary of the evidence sought to be adduced from Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja, Dr. Munawar Anees, Datuk Nallakarupan and others was given orally to the court; but on that occasion, on the application of the prosecution, the summary so given was ordered by the learned Judge not to be published in the newspaper and other media, and on the Internet until he had ruled on the issue of relevancy. 

32. I am advised by Counsel and verily believe that the ruling and requirement mentioned in paragraph 34 hereof are most unusual and would have the effect of obliging the defence to disclose to the court and to the prosecution, in advance, the evidence to be adduced from defence witnesses. 

33. In relation to letters written by the said Manjeet Singh to the Attorney General, which the defence sought to produce through Manjeet Singh and which had previously been filed in the court as part of the application referred to in paragraph 41.1 of this Affidavit, the learned Judge himself suggested that section 124 of the Evidence Act 1950 might have application to prohibit Manjeet Singh from producing it. Although, as advised by Counsel, the section in question only provides that:- 

"No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence when he considers that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure…",
the learned Judge expressed the view that it should follow that the party communicating with the public officer (who, in this case was Manjeet Singh) would also similarly be barred from disclosing the communication. Defence and the prosecution counsel were, however, invited by the learned Judge to consider and subsequently argue the point.

34. To be fair to the prosecution, the Solicitor-General, who argued for the prosecution, declined to read the section otherwise than according to what its provision say. 

35. What is of great concern to me is that the learned Judge seemed to be prepared to stretch the construction of the provisions of the section, even venturing to suggest that a lot of problems could arise if the communication was produced by Manjeet Singh (NST, 4/3/99). 

36. The letters written by Manjeet Singh to the Attorney-General and his account of a meeting he had with one of the senior deputy public prosecutors would support the defence case of police conspiracy. The meeting and letters would suggest strongly that at least one member of the prosecuting team was very much concerned with and interested in trying to get Manjeet Singh's client to unlawfully implicate me in the commission of other acts of sexual misconduct. A statutory declaration of Dr. Munawar Anees, another client of Manjeet Singh, which the defence was also seeking to introduce through Manjeet Singh (because the client has now left this country), where Dr. Munawar had said that he had been tortured by the police into falsely stating before a magistrate that he had been sodomised by me, was likewise important to the issue of police conspiracy: it would also strongly suggest that the police was resorting to all means and at all cost to secure an important bearing on the question of credibility of material prosecution witnesses in the Trial. I am advised by Counsel and verily believe that in any trial the question of the credibility of any witness is always relevant. 

37. The learned Judge, however, expressed his preliminary view that Manjeet Singh's testimony on his communication with the Attorney-General's Chambers by reference to the letters and meeting might be irrelevant and inadmissible and that the staements of Dr. Munawar in his statutory declaration might also be inadmissible. But prosecuting and defence counsel were asked to make further submissions on the point. (The SUN, 9/3/99); NST, 9/3/99) 

38. Apart from the decisions and rulings already referred to above, the learned Judge has, in the course of the Trial, dealt with points which have risen in a way that gives me grave concern:- 

1. Application to Disqualify 2 Senior Prosecuting Officers 

a. On the basis of disclosures made by Manjeet Singh in a Statutory Declaration he had made on the 8th day of November 1998, I caused an application to be filed in the High Court on the 28th day of November 1998, to disqualify two of the senior deputy public prosecutors appearing on behalf of the Public Prosecutor in the Trial, namely, Dato Abdul Gani Patail and Encik Azhar Mohamed. 

b. The grounds of the application were set out in my supporting affidavit and were based on statements made in the Statutory Declaration of Manjeet Singh, Counsel of one Datuk Nallakarupan who was charged with an offence under section 57 of the Internal Security Act 1960 for possession of a certain number of rounds of ammunication, being an offence punishable with the death sentence. 

c. Briefly, Manjeet Singh had, in his Statutory Declaration and in a letter addressed to the Attorney-General dated the 12th day of October 1998 (which was annexed to the Statutory Declaration), stated inter alia:- 

"There is no distinction in this country between first-hand and second-hand hearsay." (Notes of Proceedings - 2/3/99, about 3.0 p.m.) 

 That he had written to the Attorney-General, on the 1st day of October 1998 to ask for the charge to be amended to one under the Arms Act 1960, for which a lesser punishment was prescribed.
 That he had subsequently received a telephone call from Datuk Abdul Gani Patial to see him urgently and had done so;

 That Dato Abdul Gani Patail "had used the meeting and the death sentence… as a bargaining tool to gather evidence against Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim… He [Dato Gani] had said repeatedly, 'I am not impressed' and suggesting that he would not be impressed with any plea to a charge under the Arms Act but instead wanted more. "This 'more', and came across very loud and clear because Dato Gani laid it out in very clear and definite terms, was:-

3. Application for Bail 

a. On the 5th day of October 1998, I caused an application for bail to be filed. 

b. The application was objected by the prosecution on various grounds, the main one being that I would tamper with evidence of the prosecution witnesses if released on bail. 

c. In support of the objection the prosecution tendered police reports which were not even produced as exhibits in this Court. 

d. The learned Judge after hearing arguments, refused the application on the main ground advanced by the prosecution. 

e. On the 8th day of January 1999, at the stage of the Trial when the prosecution informed this court that they were not calling any further witnesses and would be closing their case as soon as the deferred cross-examination and re-examination of PW.21 had been completed, Counsel made a fresh application to the learned Judge for my bail. 

f. The prosecution again raised the same ground of objection contending that the risk of tampering continued until the Trial was fully completed. 

g. Counsel's argument that the apprehended risk of tampering had ceased as all witnesses had been called by the prosecution and all the other persons who were named in the List of Prosecution Witness would be made available to the defence was summarily rejected by the learned Judge who agreed with the contention of the prosecution, observing:- 

"Your (Defence) argument cannot be legally sustained, that once the prosecution case is over, there can be no tampering."

h. To Counsel's argument that "all prosecution witnesses will become our (defence's) witnesses. How can there be interference if we are entitled to interview them", the learned judge replied that he was not allowing the application. (NST 9/1/99). 

i. Pursuant to the invitation by the learned Judge to parties to present further argument, as referred to in paragraph 40 of this Affidavit, Counsel gave a summary of the evidence sought to be adduced from Datuk Nallakaruppan, Dr. Munawar Anees, Sukma Darmawan and Mior Abdul Razak. It was pointed out that the evidence of these persons who had been pressured by the police to fabricate evidence against me was to support my defence of police conspiracy. 

Thereafter legal submissions on the relevancy of such evidence as well as the evidence of Manjeet Singh commenced on the 12th day of March 1999. Basically the submission for the defence was that the defence of police conspiracy must be considered by reference to all surrounding facts and not just the evidence adduced by the prosecution. It was submitted by my Counsel that "Our contention in law is that the scheme of fabrication is one seamless transaction made up of various steps of fabrication of evidence and allegations against Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim…One cannot keep relevancy to the narrow case of the prosecution's case; it should apply to the defence case as well. Because of its very nature, it is broader ranging, relating to issues and to show bias of the prosecution's witnesses and to show the broader scheme to fabricate evidence against the Accused and cannot be restricted." 

j. The learned Judge ruled that the evidence sought to be adduced is irrelevant and admissible. 

k. From the rulings hereinbefore enumerated, the learned Judge:- 

i. has clearly made a prejudgement on the issues; 

ii. precluded my Counsel from presenting my case in full' 

iii. has expunged evidence favourable to me; 

iv. has applied as between the prosecution and the defence different standards with respect to the admissibility of evidence; 

l. The learned Judge has, during the course of the Trial, constantly intefered with Counsel's examination and cross-examination of witnesses to the extent of himself taking on the mantle of the prosecution. 

39. In the way the learned Judge has conducted the Trial, as manifested by the various rulings and decisions he has made (including that on my applications for bail); 

a. I have grave apprehension that the learned Judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind with respect to the issues and matters before him; and 

b. I do not believe that I have been given a fair trial. 

40. Now shown to me and annexed hereto as "DSAI I" is a bundle of extracts from various publications which contain observations and views as to the fairness of the Trial. 

41. Also shown to me and annexed hereto as "DSAI 2", is a bundle of the newspaper reports referred to in various paragraphs of this Affidavit, containing accounts of the Trial which I believe to be accurate. 

42. In the premises, I pray for an order in the terms of the application herein. 

Affirmed by the said 

Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim
(signed)
at Kuala Lumpur
on 15 March 1999 

Before me,

(signed)
NORSHILA BT DATO' KAMARUDDIN
Majistret
Mahkamah Majistret
Kuala Lumpur

This Affidavit is filed by Raja Aziz Addruse, Solicitor for the Applicant abovenamed and having an address of serve at 29, Jalan Nusa, 50480 Kuala Lumpur.