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FAC News - Wednesday, September 18, 2002 8:19 PM IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA IN (APPELLATE DIVISION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. (Criminal Appeal No. 44-15-2001 In The Court of BETWEEN MOHAMED EZAM BIN MOHD. NOR … APPELLANT AND KETUA POLIS NEGARA … RESPONDENT CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. (Criminal Appeal No. 44-16-2001 In The Court of BETWEEN RAJA AND KETUA POLIS NEGARA … RESPONDENT CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. (Criminal Appeal No. 44-17-2001 In The Court of BETWEEN CHUA TIAN CHANG … APPELLANT AND KETUA POLIS NEGARA … RESPONDENT CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. (Criminal Appeal No. 44-18-2001 In The Court of BETWEEN HISHAMUDIN BIN RAIS … APPELLANT AND KETUA POLIS NEGARA … RESPONDENT CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. (Criminal Appeal No. 44-19-2001 In The Court of BETWEEN SAARI BIN SUNGIB … APPELLANT AND KETUA POLIS NEGARA … RESPONDENT Coram: MOHAMED DZAIDDIN ABDULLAH, CJ WAN ADNAN ISMAIL, PCA STEVE SHIM LIP KIONG, CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) ABDUL MALEK AHMAD, FCJ SITI NORMA YAAKOB, FCJ
JUDGMENT OF STEVE L. K. SHIM, CJSS 1. The Threshold Issue I have read the judgments in draft of the learned Chief Justice Mohamed Dzaiddin and my learned brother Abdul Malek, FCJ as well as my learned sister Siti Norma, FCJ. Subject to what I have to say hereafter, I agree with their reasons and conclusions on the issues raised in these appeals. There is one significant point I need to elaborate on. This relates to the threshold issue of the reviewability of justifiability of the exercise of discretion under S. 73(1)(a) and (b) of the Internal Security Act, 1960 (hereafter “the Act”). For completeness, the whole section 73 states:- “73. (1) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe – (a) that there are grounds which would justify his detention under section 8; and (b) that he has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudice to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof. (2) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries any person, who upon being questioned by the officer fails to satisfy the officer as to his identity or as to the purposes for which he is in the place where he is found, and who the officer suspects has acted or is about to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential therein or to the economic life thereof. (3) Any person arrested under this section may be detained for a period not exceeding sixty days without an order of detention having been made in respect of him under section 8: Provided that – (a) he shall not be detained for more than twenty-four hours except with the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of Inspector; (b) he shall not be detained for more than forty-eight hours except with the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of Assistant Superintendent; and (c) he shall not be detained for more than thirty days unless a police officer of or above the rank of Deputy Superintendent has reported the circumstances of the arrest and detention to the Inspector-General or to a police officer designated by the Inspector-General in that behalf, who shall forthwith report the same to the Minister. (4) – (5) (Repealed) (6) The powers conferred upon a police officer by subsections (1) and (2) may be exercised by any member of the security forces, any person performing the duties of guard or watchman in a protected place and by any other person generally authorized in that behalf by a Chief Police Officer. (7) Any person detained under the powers conferred by this section shall be deemed to be in lawful custody, and may be detained in any prison, or in any police station, or in any other similar place authorized generally or specially by the Minister.” On this issue, I will take the same approach as Wee Cong Jin, CJ Singapore in Chng Suan Tze v The Minister Of Home Affairs & Ors And Other Appeals (1989) 1 MLJ 69 and examine it from 2 perspectives, namely, (a) whether the objective or the subjective test applies to the exercise of discretion under section 73(1) of the Act; and (b) the effect of national security considerations on the reviewability of such discretion. (2) Whether objective or subjective test applies In construing the words “reason to believe” in S.73(1), the learned High Court Judge has adopted the subjective test in line with the 2 Federal Court decisions in the Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid Bin Raja Harun (1988) 1 MLJ 182 and Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General Of Police (1988) 1 MLJ 293. To better appreciate the propositions advanced in those cases, I find it necessary to highlight in extenso, the relevant passages therein. In Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid (supra), Salleh Abbas, LP said inter alia:- “ The arrest and detention under section 73(1) is pending enquiries to see if an order under section 8 should be made by the Minister. It is clear from the language of the two sections that section 73 provides for the initial detention and cannot be divorced from section 8 of the Act which provides for the final detention.” And he later stated:- “In simple language, what section 73(1) of the Act provides is that a police officer may arrest any person in respect of whom the officer has reason to believe there are grounds to justify the person’s detention under section 8 of the Act and that person either has acted or is about to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the nation. The penal Code defines ‘reason to believe’ to mean ‘sufficient cause to believe’. Who then is to decide what is sufficient cause under section 73(1) of the Act? That is the crux of the matter. We hold that since section 73(1) and section 8 of the Act are so inextricably connected, the subjective test should be applied to both. The court cannot require the police officer to prove to the court the sufficiency of the reason for his belief under section 73(1).” This proposition was restated and expanded by Salleh Abbas LP in Theresa Lim (supra) as reflected in the following passages of his judgment:- “Looking at the provision relating to preventing detention, we cannot see how the police power of arrest and detention under section 73 could be separated from the ministerial power to issue an order of detention under section 8. We are of the opinion that there is only one preventive detention and that is based on the order to be made by the minister under section 8. However, the minister will not be in a position to make that order unless information and evidence are brought before him, and, for this purpose, the police is entrusted by the Act to carry out the necessary investigation and, pending inquiries, to arrest and detain a person, in respect of whom the police has reason to believe that there exist grounds which would justify the detention of such person under section 8. There can be no running away from the fact that the police power under section 73 is a step towards the ministerial power of issuing an order of detention under section 8, which the Attorney-General referred to as the initial stage in the process of leading to preventive detention. …. It is clear from these provisions of the Constitution, and of the ISA, that the intention of the framers of the Constitution is that judges in the matter of preventive detentions relating to the security of the Federations are the executive. This is further supported by clause (3) of Article 151, which says that the Article does not impose an obligation on ‘any authority’ – a term much wider that the “the authority on whose order any person is detained” – to disclose facts, whose disclosure would in its opinion be against the natural interest. The authority here, in our view, includes those with powers dealing with preventive detention, not only the Minister and his staff but …. also the police who are involved in arresting and detaining a person pending the enquiry under section 73 of the Act. …. To show further that evidence or information relating to arrests and detentions, either at the initial stage, or in pursuant to a ministerial order, is excluded from public disclosure is section 16, which says that the Minister or any member of an Advisory Board or any public servant shall not be required to disclose facts or to produce documents which he considers to be against the national interest to disclose. Encik Sri Ram contended that this section is only confined to the provision of ‘this chapter’, and since the chapter under which section 16 enacted is preventive detention pursuant to a ministerial order under section 8, it therefore cannot apply to the arrest at the initial stage pursuant to police power under section 73. This argument could only be right if we accept that there are two preventive detentions. We do not accept that argument. We regard that arrest and detention by the police and detention pursuant to a ministerial order or further detention after the matter has been considered by the Advisory Board as one continuous process beginning with the initial arrest and detention under section 73. We accept that the initial arrest and detention may or may not result in the issuing of the ministerial order of detention under section 8, but nevertheless, it is within one scheme of the preventive detention legislation.” From the excerpts above, it seems clear that both Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid and Theresa Lim are decided principally on the basis that S.73(1) and S.8 are inextricably linked and as such, S.16 of the Act which expressly applies to S.8, should, by implication, also apply to S.73(1), thereby giving rise to a situation where the court would be precluded from inquiring into the existence and/or sufficiency of the grounds under the section aforesaid. On that basis and reinforced by the provisions of clause (3) of Article 151 of the Constitution, they hold that the subjective test should apply in determining the words “reason to believe” in S.73(1). Everything, it seems, turns upon this inextricable connection between S.73(1) and S.8. Thus, it becomes an issue for consideration. By “inextricably connected” I would take it to mean that S.73(1) and S.8 are wholly dependant on each other – that there has to be a police investigation under S.73 before the Minister can properly exercise his discretion to issue a detention order under S.8 or conversely, that no detention order under S.8 can properly be issued by the Minister without the necessary investigation by the police under S.73. In my view, such a proposition would have the effect of inhibiting or restricting the unfettered discretion of the Minister. It would mean that the Minister could not, on his own and independent of the police, conduct any investigation or take into consideration factors extraneous to those arising from police investigation under S.73. What matters of national interest are infinitely varied. So are matters of national security of the State. These are the concerns of the Minister. In the exercise of his discretion, he need not necessarily have to consider and rely on police investigation. This is implicit in the very nature of an unfettered discretion. There may well be other public considerations of a political, social or economic nature having an impact on national security which are purely within his peculiar knowledge and which he considers relevant to his decision. Furthermore, police investigation under S.73 may stop short of submission or reference to the Minister where circumstances reveal insufficient evidence to warrant the continued detention of the detainee. In such a case, the matter would, quite conceivably, never reach the door of the Minister. Does it then follow that the powers of the Minister under S.8 have become impotent and stagnant? Clearly, if it was the intention of Parliament to impose a mandatory obligation on the part of the Minister to consider the police investigation under S.73 before he could issue a detention order under S.8, Parliament would have expressly provided for it as she did in the Dangerous Drugs (Preventive Measures) Act, 1985, wherein S.3(1) states:- “3(1). Any police officer may, without warrant, arrest and detain, for the purpose of investigation, any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe there are grounds which could justify his detention under subsection (1) of section 6.” And section 6(1) states:- “6(1): Whenever the Minister, after considering – (a) the complete report of investigation submitted under subsection (3) of section 3; and (b) the report of the Inquiry Officer submitted under subsection (4) of section 5, is satisfied with respect to any person that such person has been or is associated with any activity relating to or involving the trafficking in dangerous drugs, the Minister may, if he is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of public order that such person be detained, by order (hereinafter referred to as a “detention order”) direct that such person be detained for a period not exceeding two years from the date of such order.” Quite clearly, in the case where the Minister is deciding whether or not to issue a detention order under the Dangerous Drugs (Preventive Measures) Act, he has to consider the police investigations or reports submitted to him. There is a mandatory obligation for him to do so. Such express provisions are conspicuously absent in S.8 or S.73 of the Act. Examined in the context stated, it must mean that although S.73(1) and S.8 are connected, they can nevertheless operate quite independently of each other under certain circumstances. Section 8 is not necessarily dependent on S.73(1) and vice versa. In the circumstances, it cannot therefore be said that they are “inextricably connected”. In this respect, I must, with greatest respect, defer from the view expressed in Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid and Theresa Lim. 3. Section 16 of the Act Given the conclusion above, the applicability of S.16 to S.73(1) becomes untenable. S.16 states:- “Nothing in this Chapter or in any rules made thereunder shall require the Minister or any member of the Advisory Board or any public servant to disclose facts or to produce documents which he considers it to be against the national interest to disclose or produce.” The learned High Court Judge, following the decisions in Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid and Theresa Lim, takes the view that the right of non-disclosure under S.16 makes the test under S.73(1) a subjective one. Here, I think it is important to note the actual wording in S.16. It is expressly stated to be applicable only in relation to Chapter II, Part II of the Act. To read it as applying to S.73 which falls under Part IV would clearly be contradicting the expressed intention of Parliament. It is interesting to note that this line of argument was canvassed before the Federal Court in Theresa Lim. In rejecting it, Salleh Abbas LP said this:- “This argument could only be right if we accept that there are two preventive detentions. We do not accept that argument. We regard that arrest and detention by the police and detention pursuant to a ministerial order or further detention after the matter has been considered by the Advisory Board as one continuous process beginning with the initial arrest and detention under section 73. We accept that the initial arrest and detention may or may not result in the issuing of the ministerial order of detention under section 8, but nevertheless, it is within one scheme of the preventive detention legislation.” In my view, it must surely be a matter of common sense that any detention involves the restriction or curtailment of the liberty of an individual. Any detention order must necessarily result in the deprivation of freedom without trial and constitutes a serious transgression upon the fundamental liberty of a person. So serious indeed that Abdoolcader J. in Yeap Hock Seng v Minister Of Home Affairs, Malaysia (1975) 2 MLJ 279 was prompted to say at page 281:- “The heavy musketry of the law will always be brought to bear upon any suggestion of unlawful invasion or infringement of the personal liberty of an individual in the form of habeas corpus and kindred orders where necessary to grant relief when warranted. It was aptly put in the American case of State Ex Rel.; Evans v Broaddus that at least in times of peace every human power must give way to the writ of habeas corpus and no prison door is stout enough to stand in its way.” Under S.73(1), a person can be arrested and detained by the police pending enquiries for a maximum period of 60 days. This is quite different from the detention effected by order of the Minister under S.8 which may extend to 2 years. Quite clearly, there are 2 separate detentions involved although they may conceivably fall within one scheme of the preventive detention legislation. I pause here for a moment to reflect on that illuminating observation by Suffian FCJ (as he then was) in Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia (1969) 2 MLJ 129 when he said: “Our law is quite different from that of The highest authority referred therein was the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong. This was the position before the amendments to S.8 was effected
by the Internal Security (Amendment) Act, 1971 (Act A61) which came
into effect on “….. It is to be noted that the person who is primarily entrusted
with these most important duties (in connection with detaining persons
without trial in In my view, that observation is even more poignant when one takes into consideration the scope and extent of subsection (6) of section 73 which states:- “(6) The powers conferred upon a police officer by subsections (1) and (2) may be exercised by a member of the security forces, any person performing the duties of guard or watchman in a protected place and by any other person generally authorized in that behalf by a Chief Police Officer.” Given the enormous powers conferred upon police officers including minor officials such as guards and watchmen and the potentially devastating effect or effects arising from any misuse thereof, it could not have been a matter of accident that Parliament had thought it fit that the right of non-disclosure under S.16 should only be confined to those personalities and circumstances falling within the ambit of Chapter II of the Act and not beyond. It therefore makes sense that the subjective judgment accorded to the Minister under S.8 cannot be extended to the police in the exercise of their discretion under S.73(1). 4. Article 151(3) of the Constitution In Theresa Lim, Salleh Abbas LP has also relied on the provisions of clause (3) of Article 151 of the Constitution as a significant factor in restraining or inhibiting the court’s power of judicial review concerning the exercise of discretion by the detaining authority under S.73(1). This is reflected in the following passage of his judgment:- “Secondly, section 16 of the ISA and Article 151 clause (3) clearly authorize the executive not to disclose any information relating to national security. In that event, the court could only be limited to what has been presented before it. …. It there has been no provision of clause (3) of Article 151 and section 16, the matter, of course, could be decided by the court, whether it was really in the interest of the security that such information should be withheld. …. In this case, whether the objective or subjective test is applicable, it is clear that the court will not be in a position to review the fairness of the decision-making process by the police and the Minister because of the lack of evidence since the Constitution and the law protect them from disclosing any information and materials in their possession upon which they based their decision. Thus it is more appropriately described as a subjective test.” It is, I think, convenient to look at the whole Article 151 which states:- “151(1) Where any law or ordinance made or promulgated in pursuance to this Part provides for preventive detention – (a) the authority on whose order any person is detained under that law or ordinance shall, as soon as may be, subject to Clause (3), the allegations of fact on which the order is based, and shall give him the opportunity of making representations against the order as soon as may be; (b) no citizen shall continue to be detained under that law or ordinance unless an advisory board constituted as mentioned in Clause (2) has considered any representations made by him under paragraph (a) and made recommendations thereon to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong within three months of receiving such representations, or within such longer period as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may allow. (2) An advisory board constituted for the purposes of this Article shall consist of a chairman who shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and who shall be or have been, or be qualified to be, a judge of the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or High Court, or shall before Malaysia Day have been a judge of the Supreme Court and two other members who shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. (3) This Article does not require any authority to disclose facts whose disclosure would in its opinion be against the national interest.” There are 2 points to make on clause (3) of Article 151. First,
it relates to non-disclosure of facts upon which the detention order
is based and not the grounds for the detention. And grounds are
quite distinct from allegations of fact: (see Karam Singh v Menteri
Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri “…. Counsel for the applicants argues that the affidavits of the officer does not give the grounds and that it is the duty of the courts to look into the grounds and see if the grounds are reasonable and if the grounds are not reasonable, Article 5(3) of the Constitution has been contravened. This submission is wholly without substance. Article 5(3) of the Constitution only states that the person arrested shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and section 3(1) of the Emergency (P.O.P.C) Ordinance, 1969, only states that any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe that there are grounds which would justify his detention under section 4(1). No further conditions are required for a police officer to arrest a person under this section.” Subsequently, in the case of Inspector-General Of Police & Anor v Lee Kim Hoong (1979) 2 MLJ 291, Harun J. (as he then was) expressed a similar view but in a different context when he said:- “I should make it clear that the police are not being called upon to disclose the evidence which led to the arrest and detention but merely the grounds of arrest. All the Police have to say, for example, is that ‘Lee was arrested because we have reason to believe that it is necessary for the prevention of crimes involving violence.” Still later in Karam Singh, Suffian FCJ (as he then was) took the opportunity to explain the difference between “grounds” and “purposes” with reference to the order of detention issued by a minister under S.8 of the Act. This is what he said:- “The order of detention and the grounds, when read together, mean that because the executive thinks (grounds) that the appellant has since 1957 consistently acted in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia, therefore the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that it is necessary to detain the detainee with a view to (purposes) preventing him from doing the things specified in the order. Just as purposes are distinct from grounds of detention, so are grounds of detention distinct from allegations of fact on which the order of detention is based.” From the authorities cited, it seems clear that the grounds to
be given by the detaining authority need merely consist of general
information and not the evidential details more relevant to allegations
of fact. It is in this light that, I think, S.73(1)(a) ought to
be construed. I shall expand on this shortly. In the meantime, I
turn to the second point concerning Article 151(3). Here, I take
the view that it must be read and construed in the context of clause
(1) thereof. It relates to non-disclosure of allegations of fact
specifically to the detainee by the detaining authority on grounds
of national security. In this respect, the comments by M.P. Jain
in his book “Administrative Law Of “But, on appeal by the government, the Supreme Court took an extremely restrictive view of the scope of judicial review of preventive detention orders. It ruled that the test for the exercise of the executive discretion in such cases was subjective, and the court could not insist on evidence being given for the existence of the security aspects in the specific case as there was no obligation on the part of the concerned authority to disclose any evidence to the court. The court referred to Article 151(3) of the Constitution under which the authority cannot be required to furnish facts whose disclosure would in its opinion be against national interest. It may, however, he argued that Article 151(3) bars information from being disclosed to the detainee but not to the court. Article 151(3) obviously has reference to Article 151(1) and (2) under which the detaining authority has to supply the grounds of detention to the concerned detainee. The court is under a constitutional obligation to be satisfied that the detention was lawful. This obligation has been placed on the court by Article 5(1) and (2) of the Constitution. How is the court going to discharge this obligation if it is denied all relevant information.” I think there is merit in the proposition that Article 151(3) merely bars information concerning matters of national security from being disclosed to the detainee and not to the court as such. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate or suggest any such prohibition from disclosure to the courts for the purpose of judicial review. 5. Whether preconditions in S.73(1) complied with Given the reasons stated above, I take the view that as the arrest and detention by the police officer entail the curtailment of the liberty of a subject involving, as I have said, as basic and fundamental right, his exercise of discretion under S.73(1) is therefore subject to the objective test and thus reviewable by a court of law. The decision of the police officer is objectively justifiable. This means that the question whether a police officer has the required “reason to believe” when he makes the arrest and detention in reliance on S.73(1) is objectively justiciable. The burden is on the police officer to satisfy the court that the preconditions constituting the said section which set out the jurisdictional threshold requisite to the exercise of arrest and detention have been complied with. Only if the preconditions specified therein are fulfilled can the police officer be said to have the rights flowing from the section: (see Minister Of Law & Order & Ors v Pavlicevic (1989) SA 679). What are these preconditions in S.73(1)? Therein, the police officer
must have reason to believe (a) that there are grounds which would
justify detention of the detainee under S.8 and (b) that the detainee
has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial
to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance
of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof. In
this case, I think the affidavits filed by the respondent to indicate
that at the time of their arrests, the detainees were told that
they were arrested and detained for having acted in a manner likely
to prejudice the security of the country. Based on the authorities
cited earlier, this would be sufficient to comply with S.73(1)(a).
However, the situation is quite different with respect to S.73(1)(b).
Here, the burden is on the respondent to satisfy the court by way
of material evidence that the detaining authority had reason to
believe that the detainees had acted or were about to act or were
likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia.
A thorough perusal of the affidavits filed by the respondents find
them to contain nothing more than bare denials in response to the
allegations contained in the affidavits affirmed by the respective
appellants. This is hardly surprising given his reliance on S.16
of the Act and Article 151(3) of the Constitution. No particulars
have been disclosed in the respondent’s affidavits to show that
the appellants had acted or were about to act or were likely to
act in any manner prejudicial to the security of 6. Effect of national security considerations I mentioned at the outset the necessity for examining the effect of national security considerations on the reviewability of the exercise of discretion of the detaining authority under S.73(1). Indeed, this is one of the focal points in the respondent’s case. Dato’ Azahar has submitted that it is important to look at the subject matter on which the authority is called upon to decide – that if it concerns a matter of national security which is entirely the responsibility of the Government, the courts should not intervene. In short, the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security. He relies, quite obviously, on the English case of Council Of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister For The Civil Service (1985) IAC 374. He cites at length various passages in the speeches of the Law Lords who heard the case but I think the following observation of Lord Fraser seems to sum up the thrust of his submission:- “Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges of what the national security requires. It would be obviously undesirable that such matters should be made the subject of evidence in a court of law or otherwise discussed in public.” I accept the correctness of that proposition. The executive, by
virtue of its responsibilities, has to be the sole judge of what
the national security requires. However, although a court will not
question the executive’s decision as to what national security requires,
the court will nevertheless examine whether the executive’s decision
is in fact based on national security considerations. Here, I would
subscribe to the observation of Wee Chong Jin CJ ( “It is clear that where a decision is based on considerations of
national security, judicial review of that decision would be precluded.
In such cases, the decision would be based on a consideration of
what national security requires, and the authorities are unanimous
in holding that what national security requires is to be left solely
to those who are responsible for national security. The It is in the light of the principle enunciated that the present
case has to be examined. In my view where the arrests and detentions
of the appellants are said to be based on the belief of the detaining
authority relating to the preconditions specified in S.73(1)(a)
& (b) of the Act, the Court is perfectly entitled to inquire
whether those preconditions have been complied with. I have held
earlier that the respondent has adduced sufficient grounds in compliance
with S.73(1)(a). However, the same cannot be said in respect of
S.73(1)(b). Here, the Court is entitled to inquire into the basis
for the detaining authority’s reason to believe that the appellants
had acted or were about to act or were likely to act in a manner
prejudicial to the security of 7. Conclusion For all the reasons stated, I find it appropriate to agree with the learned Chief Justice and my learned brother and sister Judges in holding that the detentions of the appellants by the police under S.73(1) of the Act are therefore unlawful. In that context, I agree that the appeals should be allowed and the appellants be released accordingly. However, as the undisputed facts show that the appellants i.e. 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th appellants have now been detained by order of the Minister under S.8 of the Act, the issue of whether or not to grant the writ of habeas corpus for their release from current detention does not concern us. That is a matter of a different exercise. (STEVE SHIM LIP KIONG) Chief Judge, Sabah & Sarawak Date of delivery of judgment: 6.9.2002 Date of hearing: 6.6.2001, 10.7.2001, 6.8.2001, 15.10.2001, 29-30.10.2001, 17-18.10.2001, 19.11.2001, 25-28.2.2001 Counsel for the Appellant: Tuan Hj. Sulaiman Abdullah Encik Sivarasa Rasiah Encik Christopher Leong Encik Malik Imtiaz Sarwar Cik Moganambal Murugappan Messrs Daim & Gamany Advocates, Counsel for the Respondent: Dato’ Seri Ainum Bt. Mohd. Saaid (Attorney General) Dato’ Abdul Ghani Bin Patail (Attorney General) Dato’ Azahar Bin Hj. Mohamed Mohd. Yusof Bin Hj. Zainal Abiden Dato’ Mary Lim Thiam Suan Encik Tun Abdul Majid Tun Hamzah Encik Kamaludin bin Mohd. Said Attorney General Chambers, Watching Brief: Encik Roy Rajasingham Bar Council
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