FAC News - Wednesday, September 18, 2002 8:25 PM
DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA
BERSIDANG DI KUALA LUMPUR
(BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN)
MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH
BIL: 05-8-2001(W)
(WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PERMOHONAN JENAYAH
BIL: 44-15-2001)
1. MOHAMAD EZAM BIN MOHD NOOR - PEMOHON
KETUA POLIS NEGARA - RESPONDEN
MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH
BIL: 05-9-2001(W)
(WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PERMOHONAN JENAYAH
BIL: 44-16-2001)
2. RAJA PETRA BIN RAJA KAMARUDIN - PEMOHON
KETUA POLIS NEGARA - RESPONDEN
MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH
BIL: 05-10-2001(W)
(WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PERMOHONAN JENAYAH
BJL: 44-17-2001)
3. CHUA TIAN CHANG - PEMOHON
KETUA POLIS NEGARA - RESPONDEN
MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH
BIL: 05-11-2001(W)
(WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PERMOHONAN JENAYAH
BIL: 44-18-2001)
4. HISHAMUDIN BIN RAIS - PEMOHON
KETUA POLIS NEGARA - RESPONDEN
MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH
BIL: 05-12-2001(W)
(WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PERMOHONAN JENAYAH
BIL: 44-19-2001)
5. SAARI BIN SUNGIB - PEMOHON
KETUA POLIS NEGARA - RESPONDEN
Coram:
Mohamed Dzaiddin, CJ
Wan Adnan Ismail, PCA
Steve Shim Lip Kiong, CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)
Abdul Malek Ahmad, FCJ
Siti Norma Yaakob, FCJ
JUDGMENT OF MOHAMED DZAIDDIN, CJ
This is an appeal by the appellants against the decision of the High Court Kuala Lumpur given on 25 April 2001 refusing to grant the writ of habeas corpus for their release. The appellants who were Reformasi activists were arrested and detained on 10 and 11 April 2001 under section 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 (the ISA).
There are several grounds of appeal put forward on their behalf contending that their arrest and detention are illegal. Leading counsel for the appellants has categorized them under five main heads. Each one of us will deal with the issues raised by counsel in our separate judgments.
To avoid any repetition, my learned brother, Abdul Malek, FCJ has set out the chronology of events and the preliminary issues in his judgment.
I shall deal with the issue of mala fides raised by Tuan Haji Sulaiman.
In the High Court
The learned trial judge approached this issue by questioning whether the applicants have made out a case of mala fide against the respondent. In his Lordship’s view this requires a consideration of whether the detention was made in bad faith and not the sufficiency of the grounds of detention.
The material parts of the respondent’s affidavit disclosing the reasons for the detention read:
5. Pada akhir tahun 2000 aktivis reformasi telah membuat ketetapan untuk menggunakan dua pendekatan berikut bagi mencapai matlamat mereka:
5.1 Akan terus melibatkan diri dalam proses demokrasi yang normal serta sistem pilihanraya: dan
5.2 melalui cara-cara di luar perlembagaan dengan mencetuskan demonstrasi jalanan secara besar-besaran dan bercorak militan menjelang Pilihanraya Umum 2004.
6. Ke arah merealisasikan perancangan tersebut, satu kumpulan sulit yang dianggotai oleh lebih kurang 20 orang aktivis reformasi telah diwujudkan di KUALA LUMPUR. Sejak JANUARI 2001 hingga 4 APRIL 2001, sebanyak 12 perjumpaan sulit telah diadakan oleh kumpulan ini bagi merancang untuk mempengaruhi rakyat membudayakan demonstrasi jalanan dan perhimpunan kaum secara militan. Antara perancangan terpenting gerakan reformasi dalam masa yang terdekat ini adalah untuk menganjurkan demonstrasi jalanan yang dipanggil Black 14 secara besar-besaran di KUALA LUMPUR pada 14 APR 2001. Bagi mengelirukan pihak keselamatan. perhimpunan tersebut dipanggil Perhimpunan Penyerahan Memorandum Rakyat Mengenai Hak Asasi Manusia di mana mereka merancang untuk mengumpulkan seramai lebih kurang 50,000 orang yang akan berhimpun di sekitar Kuala Lumpur. Perhimpunan serta perarakan ini berpotensi menjadi rusuhan.
7. Adalah jelas aktivis refomasi sanggup melaksanakan kegiatan-kegiatan di luar perlembagaan dan undang-undang demi mencapai matlamat mereka. Oleh itu tindakan di bawah sek.73(1) AKDN 1960 diambil kerana pihak Polis mempercayai ada alasan-alasan untuk menahan mereka di bawah Sek. 8 AKDN 1960 kerana telah bertindak dengan cara yang memudharatkan keselamatan negara.
The motion for writ of habeas corpus was supported by an affidavit of Bahirah binti Tajul Aris, the wife of the lst appellant. Apparently, parties agreed that arguments before the trial judge was based on the motion of the 1st appellant with the result binding on the other appellants. The relevant parts of her affidavit read:
11. Saya diberi sesalinan kenyataan akhbar bertarikh 11 April 200I bertajuk “kenyataan Akhbar mengenai Penangkapan di bawah Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri (AKDN) l960” yang dikeluarkan oleh Responden kononnya sebagai alasan-alasan untuk tangkapan dan tahanan Pemohon dan enam orang yang lain. Sesalinan benar kenyataan akhbar tersebut ditunjuk kepada saya bertanda “BTA-2”.
12. Kenyataan akhbar itu menuduh bahawa Pemohon terlibat dalam kegiatan yang boleh memudaratkan keselamatan negara dan telah bertindak secara militan dengan mengambil perdekatan seperti berikut
a. telah rnelaksanakan langkah-langkah tertentu untuk mendapatkan bahan letupan termasuk bom dan grenade launcher.
b. menggunakan molotov cocktail, ball bearing serta berbagai-bagai senjata berbahaya untuk menyerang pihak keselamatan bagi menimbulkan keadaan huru hara semasa demonstrasi jalanan di sekitar Kuala Lumpur pada Okt 1998; dan
c mendapatkan bantuan dan sokongan guru-guru silat serta mempengaruhi sebilangan bekas pegawai dan anggota keselamatan untuk menyertai gerakan mereka.
Kenyataan akhbar juga menuduh bahawa Pemohon telah menjalankan kegiatan-kegiatan yang boleh mewujudkan ketegangan kaum melalui isu keagamaan dan perkauman.
13. Saya berkata bahawa semua pengataan-pengataan ini dan tuduhan-tuduhan lain dalam eksibit BTA-2 adalah tidak benar dan adalah pembohongan yang dibuat oleh pihak Responden dengan niat mala fide yang bemotif politik. Pendirian saya disokong oleh kenyataan akhbar oleh Presiden Parti Rakyat Malaysia, Dr. Syed Husin Ali bertarikh 11 April 2001 bertajuk “Police tell lies to save Prime Minister”. Sesalinan benar kenyataan akhbar tersebut ditunjuk kepada saya bertanda “BTA-3”
14. Di dalam kenyataan akhbar oleh pihak Responden, juga disebut bahawa Pemohon telah merancang perhimpunan haram yang militan pada 14 April 2001. Ini juga adalah satu pembohongan. Saya telah diberi surat-suratan di antara Jawatankuasa Memorandum Rakyat 14 April dan pihak SUHAKAM (Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia) di mana adalah jelas bahawa perhimpunan itu bertujuan untuk rnenghantar satu memorandum kepada SUHAKAM. Jawatankuasa itu telah secara telus dan bersopan mengaturkan satu appointment dengan SUHAKAM untuk penyerahan itu. Sesalinan benar surat-suratan ini bertarikh 30 Mac dan 11 April ditunjuk kepada saya bertanda “BTA-4”
The respondent in his affidavit in reply admitted to issuing the press statement and avers as follows:-
6. Saya merujuk kepada perenggan 12 Afidavit Bahirah dan saya menyatakan bahawa kegiatan-kegiatan yang dianjurkan itu tidak merujuk secara khusus kepada Pemohon tetapi merujuk kepada ‘Gerakan Reformasi’ yang mana Pemohon adalah seorang ahli aktivis gerakan berkenaan.
7. Saya menafikan segala dakwaan-dakwaan yang terkandung di dalam perenggan 13 Afidavit Bahirah dan menyatakan bahawa penangkapan pemohon bukan berniat mala fide yang bermotif politik tetapi adalah berkaitan dengan Pemohon yang boleh menggugat keselamatan negara. [Emphasis added]
8 Dakwaan-dakwaan yang terkandung di dalam perenggan 14 Affidavit Bahirah adalah tidak berar dan dinafikan. Saya dengan sesungguhnya mempercayai bahawa perkara-perkara yang didakwakan. olehnya adalah di luar pengetahuannya dan selanjutnya saya mengulangi apa yang saya telah katakan di dalam perenggan 6 kenyataan akhbar saya yang bentarikh 11/4/01.”
The learned judge in dismissing the application held that the appellant had been arrested and detained in the exercise of a valid power. The learned judge also held that the requirements of s. 73(3)(a) and (b) have been complied with in authorizing the further detention of the appellant and that the detention orders showed that the officers concerned have applied their minds in authorizing the detention.
Section 73(3)(a) and (b) provides:
(3) Any person arrested under this section may be detained for a period not exceeding sixty days without an order of detention having been made in respect in him under section 8:
Provided that —
(a) he shall not be detained for more than twenty-four hours except with the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of Inspector;
(b) he shall not be detained for more than forty-eight hours except with the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of Assistant Superintendent: and”
The learned judge had also considered whether the facts disclosed in the press statement are sufficient to enable him to conduct an objective test on the validity of the arrest and detention of the appellants. He was of the view that the press statement was only a partial disclosure and therefore it was not possible for him to ascertain whether the arrest and detention of the appellants were justified.
The learned judge was of the view that the facts disclosed in the press statement are not exhaustive and not in great detail rendering it impossible for him to apply the objective test.
For the above reasons, he was satisfied that the appellants had not discharged the burden on them to show that the respondent acted mala fide in their arrest and detention.
In this Court
Before us, Tuan Haji Sulaiman Abdullah raised the issue of male fides on the following grounds:-
1. Interrogation and investigation while in detention made no reference to the respondent’s press statement against them. There were also long hours of interrogation.
Questions were not asked in relation to the alleged militant action. Appellants were subjected to intimidation and abuse.
3. Interrogations were on —
(a) political views
(b) involvement in creating turmoil/disturbances
(c) Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s sexual activities
(d) opposition parties and their leaders
(e) sexual allegations
(f) street demonstrations
(g) Lunas by-election
(h) Source of funding of Keadilan
The appellants relied on the following affidavits, for which leave was granted on 6 August 2001 to adduce them as evidence in this appeal:
i) affidavit affirmed by Mohamed Ezam bin Mohamad Noor on 4 July 2001, (Ezam’s affidavit);
ii) affidavit affirmed by Chua Tian Chang on 4 July 2001 (Chua’s affidavit);
iii) affidavit affirmed by Hishamudin bin Rais affirmed on 4 July 2001 (Hishamudin’s affidavit)
affidavit affirmed by Saari bin Sungib on 4 July 2001 (Saari’s affidavit);
v) further affidavit jointly affirmed by Mohamed Ezam bin Mohamed Noor: Chua Tian Chang, Saari bin Sungib and Hishamuddin bin Mohd Rais 31st July 2001.
In essence, the facts deposed in the above-mentioned affidavits relate to the questions upon which they were interrogated; the conditions of the detention places and the manner in which the deponents were treated whilst under detention.
It was the contention of Haji Sulaiman that the respondent despite the direction of the court to file detailed affidavits by persons involved in the interrogation of the appellants merely filed general affidavits without condescending to particulars and without stating whether they had direct or personal knowledge of the events. Counsel submitted that the affidavits of the five deponents were hearsay.
Secondly, counsel submitted that the replies to the appellants’ depositions were essentially bare denials and did not amount to credible denial.
Thirdly, he pointed out that the appellants’ affidavits stated that the line of questioning during interrogations was not related to the issue that they were threats to national security and these questions were clearly unrelated to the key allegations in the respondent’s press statement.
It was finally submitted that the detention was mala fide.
For the respondent, it was submitted that the purpose of detention under s. 73(1) ISA is to enable the police to conduct investigation in order to:
(a) gather more information in relation to the appellants act and conduct which are prejudicial to the security of Malaysia;
(b) ascertain whether based on the information gathered, there would be grounds to justify the detention under section 8 ISA and to report the same to the Minister.
As such, learned Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor submitted that, the interrogations on the appellants’ political views; involvement in creating turmoil and disturbances; street demonstration; Lunas by-election and the source of funding of Keadilan would be relevant for the purposes of investigation. He relied on De Smith’s on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edition where the author formulated five tests to determine the validity of a particular administrative action. The tests are as follows:
(i) what was the purpose for which the power was exercised?
(ii) what was the dominant purpose for which the power was exercised?
(iii) would the power still have been exercised if the actor had not desired concurrently to achieve an illicit purpose?
(iv) was any of the purposes pursued an authorised purpose?
(v) was any of the purposes pursued an unauthorised purpose?
Applying the subjective test and the first 4 tests enumerated above, Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor urged the Court to hold that the arrest and detention of the appellants are lawful; that while on the face of it the interrogations relating to matters enumerated above may be irrelevant to national security and may be for the purposes other than the purpose intended under s. 73(1) ISA, the application of the subjective test and the 4 tests referred to above precluded the court from holding that the interrogations are not relevant for the purpose as intended in s. 73(1) ISA.
Finally, it was submitted that while the interrogations on those matters which appear to be irrelevant might possibly reflect some suspicion of mala fide, it cannot be taken for granted or considered sufficient proof by itself of mala fide. Further, merely being questioned on some matters which appear irrelevant to national security cannot by itself amount to mala fide.
In his reply, Haji Sulaiman submitted that the formulation as stated by the Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor with respect to the purpose of s. 73 ISA was incorrect. It would in fact allow the police to detain an individual for the purpose of building a case against the individual. This is not correct as by a clear reading of section 73(1)(a) and (b), at the time of the arrest, the arresting police officer must have already come to a conclusion that the individual was a threat to national security. Investigations are then carried out for the purpose of ascertaining whether the individual will continue as a threat to national security. This is the dominant purpose of section 73. This analysis of section 73(1)(a) and (b) had been conceded by Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor Mohd. Yusof Zainal Abiden. As such, arresting the individual merely for the purpose of gathering intelligence with a view to detaining the person is not authorized under the ISA, or any other legislation for the matter. Counsel stressed that arresting an individual for that purpose is as such clearly illegal and outside the scope of section 73.
Haji Sulaiman pointed out that Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor Dato’ Azahar conceded on 6.8.2001 that the questions were asked for the purpose of intelligence gathering. He said this in denying that the questioning was mala fide. It follows that the appellants were arrested to allow the police to gather information. If so, by Dato Azahar’s own concession, the detention (for the purpose of questioning) was clearly outside the scope of the dominant purpose of section 73.
With respect to De Smith’s formulation, Haji Sulaiman, agreed that if a power is granted for one purpose is exercised for a different purpose that power has not been validly exercised. He however submitted that the five tests were incorrectly set out by the learned Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor and that the collateral purpose was the true purpose. It was further submitted that on the basis of each of the five tests, as well as on a consideration of their combined effect, the purported exercise of power under the ISA to arrest the appellants was an invalid exercise of power. He relied on what De Smith said at page 333, “an improper motive or purpose may if it affects the quality of the act, have the effect of rendering invalid what is done”.
Counsel also adopted what is stated at page 334, ‘if a prima facie case of abuse of power by a public authority has been established, the failure of that authority to adduce any evidence in reply from which it can reasonably be inferred that the avowed purposes had in fact been pursued may lead a court to the conclusion that they have not been genuinely pursued.
In reply to the submission on behalf of the respondent that the subjective test applies and that the court is precluded from holding that the interrogations are irrelevant for the purpose of s. 73(1) ISA, Haji Sulaiman urged us to depart from Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors V. Inspector General of Polis (1988) 1 MLJ 293 and Inspector General of Polis v. Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun (1988) 1MLJ 182 and adopt the objective test as set out in Chng Sum, Tze v. The Minister of Home Affairs & Ors and other appeals (1989) 1MLJ 69.
I pause to say that I have had the advantage of reading the draft judgment of Abdul Malek, FCJ and I agree entirely with his view that the test for s. 73 ISA is an objective test following Chng Suan Tze (supra) and as such I can examine the various affidavits for the purpose of determining mala fide or whether the power under s. 73 was exercised improperly by the respondent.
Ezam’s affidavit avers inter alia that he was questioned on his political stand and the reasons why he opposed Dr. Mahathir, UMN0 and Barisan Nasional. He also deposed that he was asked about his meeting with ASEAN leaders and that the police who interrogated him wanted to find out the strength of valid, international, political and diplomatic relationships that did not involve violence at all. Ezam’s affidavit further deposed that the police were trying to gauge the strength of influence of Barisan Alternatif political parties and that it was no longer the question of national security.
Ezam’s affidavit further deposed that he was interrogated on his financial resources; the party’s financial resources; Datin Seri Wan Azizah bt. Wan Ismail’s financial resources; attempts to split party leadership; other Barisan Alternative’s parties problems; Barisan Alternative’s plans; the financial sources during the 1999 general election and Lunas by-election; party and party youth wing structure; the Dato’ Seri Anwar lbrahim’s case; and questions concerning UMNO — the influence of Dato’ Seri Anwar in UMNO. It was further averred that the interrogation party had asked the appellant to abandon Dato’ Seri Anwar and that he could remain in the party but can no longer raise or fight issues about the injustice against Dato’ Seri Anwar; that this issue was amongst the main focus of the interrogation on the appellant. (Para 39 & 40 of Ezam’s affidavit refers)
Vide para 32 of the affidavit, Ezam avers inter alia that he was being interrogated continuously by a group of seven interrogating officers, beginning about 8.00 until 4.00 to 5.00 in the morning for two days running and they would begin again about 10.00 am until 3.00 the next day.
At para 47 of the affidavit he stated inter alia, that at all times of his detention, he was never clearly informed of the details on why he was detained. Rather throughout the detention and interrogation period, he thought that he was detained because of his political beliefs, programmes and public awareness activities for the nation through political rallies held by parties in Barisan Alternative or political threats to Prime Minister, UMNO and Barisan Nasional, and not for the reasons stated by the Inspector General of Police in the press conference dated 11 April 2001.
Chua’s affidavit avers inter alia that he was never told of the grounds or reasons for his arrest and detention; that his arrest and detention was a mere “fishing exercise” and politically motivated, all of which had nothing to do with national security. Chua’s affidavit further states that he was asked about the Opposition’s strategy when it won the Lunas by-election; the Teluk Kemang by-election and why he joined Keadilan. He was also asked to state his views about the political situation in Malaysia; meritocracy, Malay rights and the Barisan Nasional government.
The Law:
I need to rely only on two authorities.
(1) Basu’s Commentary on the Constitution of India, 15th Edition Vol.2 p. 153 states:
An order of detention is mala fide if it is made for a ‘collateral or ‘ulterior’ purpose, i.e. a purpose other than what the Legislature had in view in passing the law of preventive detention (i.e., prevention of acts prejudicial to the security of the State, maintenance of public order and so on). There is a mala fide exercise or the power if the grounds upon which the order is based are not proper or relevant grounds which would justify detention under the provisions of the law itself, or when it appears that the authority making the order did not apply his mind to it at all, or made it for a purpose other than that mentioned in the detention order.
The question of mala fides has to be decided with reference to the facts of each case and the observations in one case cannot be regarded as a precedent in dealing with other cases
The onus of proving mala fides is upon the detenu, and the trend of recent decisions shows that it is not likely that the detenu may succeed in many cases.
(2) In Yeap Hock Song @ Ah Song v. Minister of Home Affairs Malaysia & Ors (1975) 2 MLJ 279 it was held, inter alia, that (1) the onus of proving male fide on the part of the detaining authority is on the applicant and is normally extremely difficult to discharge as what is required is proof of improper or bad motive in order to invalidate the detention or order for mala fide and not mere suspicions and (2) where an order of detention is challenged on the ground of mala fide, what has got to be made out is not the want of bona fide on the part of the police, but the want of bona fide as well as the non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority which for this purpose must be taken to be different from the police.
Conclusion:
The question for decision here is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the appellants have discharged the burden of showing that the respondent acted mala fide in their arrest and detention.
The thrust of the appellants’ contention in this case is that the exercise of the powers of detention by the respondent under s. 73(1) ISA is mala fide and improper because from the evidence and circumstances of the case, their arrest and detention was not for the dominant purpose of s. 73 i.e. to enable the police to conduct further investigation regarding the appellants acts and conduct which are prejudicial to the security of Malaysia, but merely for intelligence gathering which is unconnected with national security.
My first observation is that despite the press statement of the respondent that the appellants were detained because they were a threat to national security, it is surprising to note from the appellants affidavits that they were not interrogated on the militant actions and neither were they questioned about getting explosives materials and weapons. Clearly, from the affidavits which I highlighted above, the questions that were asked were more on the appellants’ political activities and for intelligence gathering. I find that there is much force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the detentions were for the ulterior purpose and unconnected with national security.
Secondly, the affidavits in reply affirmed by the five officers of the interrogating teams failed to state that they were directly involved in the interrogations as there were no details of their involvement. They also have not deposed that they had personal knowledge of the questions asked of the appellants. Their affidavits appear to be in the same format. Based on the above factors, it is safe to conclude that they are hearsay.
Thirdly, it is to be noted that the replies deposed by these officers to the averments of the appellants in their respective affidavits are bare denials. Here, I agree with Haji Sulaiman that the affidavits are grossly inadequate and cannot by any stretch of imagination amount to a credible denial or a credible rebuttal of the specific averments of the appellants that they were detained because of their political beliefs and not because they were a threat to national security.
Fourthly in the context of the above observation on the quality of the respondent’s affidavits in reply, I would adopt the statement in De Smith, at p. 334, that “if a prima facie case of abuse of power by a public authority has been established, the failure of that authority to adduce any evidence in reply from which it can reasonably be inferred that the avowed purposes had in fact been pursued may lead a court to the conclusion that they have not been genuinely pursued”.
“Mala fide does not mean at all a malicious intention. It normally means that a power is exercised for a collateral or ulterior purpose i.e. for a purpose other than the purpose for which it is professed to have been exercised” per Peh Swee Chin J., (as he then was) in Karpal Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor (1988) 1 MLJ 468, 473. It is in this context that I am satisfied that the appellants have discharged the burden of proving mala fide on the part of the respondent. In my judgment, the appellants have succeeded in showing that the respondent had acted mala fide in their arrest and detention under s. 73 ISA.
Accordingly, I would allow these appeals and issue the writ of habeas corpus for the appellants to be set at liberty and be released.
Lastly, with respect to the remaining grounds of appeal, I have had the opportunity of reading the draft judgments of my learned brothers, Steve Shim CJ Sabah & Sarawak and Abdul Malek FCJ and my learned sister, Siti Norma FCJ and I agree with the reasons and conclusion.
TUN MOHAMED DZAIDDIN HAJI ABDULLAH
Ketua Hakim Negara
Malaysia
Dated: 6 September 2002
Hj. Sulaiman Abdullah (Sivarasa Rasiah, Christopher Leong, Malik Imtiaz Sarwar and Moganambal Murugappan with him) for the Appellants.
Solicitor: Messrs Daim & Gamany
Kuala Lumpur.
Dato Seri Ainum Said and Dato’ Abdul Gani Patail
Attorney Generals of Malaysia
Dato’ Azahar Mohamed, Mohd. Yusof Zainal Abiden, Dato’ Mary Lim Thiam Suan, Tun Abdul Majid Tun Hamzah and Kamaluddin Mohd.
Said, Senior Deputy Public Prosecutors with them) for the Respondent.
Solicitors: Attorney General’s Chambers
Malaysia.
Roy Rajasingam and Low Beng Choo watching brief for the Bar Council.
