THE idea of Malay unity has been like a mirage hovering over the country's political life for decades.

All the Umno leaders, without exception, have sought to bring the ummah (Muslim community) together - as one - in order to ensure that the Malays remain at the heart of Malaysian political life.

However, dreams of reuniting the community tend to overlook the realities of modern Malaysia. They are romantic and they are emotive but are they relevant?

Can the Malays be considered as a uniform and unvariegated constituency any longer?

What are the similarities between an ustaz (religious leader) from Kelantan, an electrical engineer working in Seberang Perai, a factory worker in Taiping, a Damansara housewife with children studying in London, a Felda settler, a government clerk in Mersing and a fisherman from Terengganu?

It has become increasingly obvious to many of us that a dynamic community of well over 10 million people cannot possibly be represented by just one political party, Parti Islam (PAS) and Parti Keadilan Nasional included, either now or in the future.

In short, the Malay population has become - and this is a Malaysian triumph - extraordinarily diverse.

For many observers, the calls for Perpaduan Melayu! (Malay Solidarity!) are an indication of Umno's present mindset and its continuing refusal to address current political challenges head-on. 

LOOSENED COMMUNITY BONDS 

TO MY mind, conceding that Malay unity is a chimera - an unachievable goal - has nothing to do with the position of the Malay community within the altered political landscape.

Three factors:

There are two main reasons why the community no longer views itself as a monolithic bloc: the impact of decades of economic growth; and the burgeoning of political activism.

A third factor is: There is an overlooked but vitally important rift within one section of Malay society that has serious implications for the nation's future - namely, the acrimonious divisions among the Malay liberals. 

Firstly, economic growth, educational opportunities and the relatively benign impact of the NEP have ensured that the feudal bonds that once shackled the Malays have been loosened.

The arguments are so well-known I will not dwell on them, except to say that the poverty and ignorance that used to bedevil the community - trapping them in rural areas - have been largely eradicated. 

Secondly, the rise of political activism.

The explosion of views and the proliferation of opinions since 1998 have been a shock to those who grew up in the more sedate and consensual climate of the 1970s and 1980s.

Empowered by their education, the Malay community is more articulate, politically-aware and increasingly aggressive. 

Having found their 'voice', they have stumbled onto the value of political activism and, in a startling burst of life, people are demanding greater accountability and transparency - not only from political leaders but also from service providers, district councils and government agencies.

This trend will continue to grow, forcing politicians to learn how to deal with a less trusting populace. 

However, activism inevitably results in a fragmentation of concerns.

As interests diverge and hot-button issues begin to vary from state to state and across socio-economic class lines, Malay unity will become an even more elusive goal. 

FALLOUT FROM 1998 RUPTURE 

THE third factor is the rupture within the ranks of the Malay liberals and why it will have a worrying impact on the nation's future.

The events of 1998 ripped their way through the small but influential circle of liberals leaving them on both sides of the increasingly nasty political slugfest. 

In the past, the liberals (both inside and outside government) have played an important role in moderating Malay communal sentiment and curbing religious obscurantism.

Injecting a note of pragmatism and realism into public debate, they have been critical in ensuring that the Malaysian experiment - its multi-racial quality - has not veered off into extremism. 

UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 

IT IS hard to imagine what Malaysia would have been like without men and women like the late Tun Dr Ismail, Ms Adibah Amin, Dr Munir Majid, Dr Wan Azizah, Tan Sri Musa Hitam, Mr Rustam Sani, the late Tan Sri Zain Azraai, Dr Chandra Muzaffar, Datuk Shahrir Samad and former prime ministers Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Hussein Onn.

Practical and principled, they understood the threat that extremism - whether religious or racial - posed to the nation. 

In essence, the Mahathir-Anwar alliance of the mid-90s represented the epitome of the liberal Malay agenda, with each man balancing the other's tendency towards extremism.

On the one hand, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad's natural inclination towards Malay nationalism was tempered by Anwar Ibrahim's cultural experiments.

Similarly, it can be argued that Anwar's desire for a more Islamic administration was tempered by the Prime Minister's moderation in this critical area. 

With the middle ground decimated by the Anwar debacle and the liberals squabbling among themselves, the political discourse has drifted dangerously close to the two coordinates of Malay identity: race and religion.

Umno champions the first, and PAS the second. 

FATALLY WEAKENED MODERATE AGENDA 

AS THE two parties join in battle - raising the stakes in a disturbing fashion - the Malay liberals, divided and uncertain, are left on the sidelines.

Small in number, and divided, they lack the critical mass to intercede. As a result, the political discourse will not return to a more productive and less explosive tone. 

It is not hard to trace the reasons for the sidelining of the liberal agenda.

In the years up to 1997, Umno and Barisan Nasional were able to argue that they provided the best path to economic and political development.

Furthermore, the gradual broadening of media freedoms in 1995 and 1996 seemed to presage a more liberal domestic environment.

However, the loss of legitimacy attendant on the collapse of the ringgit as well as the gross missteps of September 1998 led to a wholesale desertion of the government by many Malay liberals.

The authoritarian turn of events benefited Keadilan and PAS, both of which advocated a complete overhaul of the country in order to rid Malaysia of corruption and injustice.

A few - lacking confidence in PAS' sudden liberal credentials and sceptical of Keadilan's chances of controlling the ulamak (religious scholars) - stayed with the Barisan Nasional. 

The division of the liberal community into two leaves the nation's moderate agenda fatally weakened.

If this turn of events is not remedied, the future of the Malay community, and indeed of Malaysia, will be framed exclusively by the extremists - whether they be religious or racial - to the detriment of the nation as a whole. 

(The writer is a Kuala Lumpur-based lawyer and author. This article first appeared in The Business Times of Jan 20.)