War on terrorism: Where Do We Go From Here?

If everyone pledges to join the war against terrorism, and there are only a few of them, what are the problems of winning? In this article, Henry Kissinger covers these and suggests what needs to be done.

By Henry Kissinger

As the war against the Taliban gathers momentum, it is important to see it in its proper perspective.

President Bush has eloquently described the objective as the destruction of state-supported terrorism. And for all its novelty, the new warfare permits a clear definition of victory.

The terrorists are ruthless, but not numerous. They control no territory permanently.

If their activities are harassed by the security forces of all countries -- if no country will harbour them -- they will become outlaws and increasingly obliged to devote efforts to elemental survival.

If they attempt to commandeer a part of a country, as has happened to some extent in Afghanistan and Colombia, they can be hunted down by military operations.

The key to anti-terrorism strategy is to eliminate safe havens. These safe havens come about in various ways.

In some countries, domestic legislation or constitutional restraints inhibit surveillance unless there are demonstrated criminal acts, or they prevent transmitting what is ostensibly domestic intelligence to other countries -- as seems to be the case in Germany and, to some extent, the United States.

Remedial measures with respect to these situations are in train. But the overwhelming majority of safe havens occur when a government closes its eyes because it agrees with at least some of the objectives of the terrorists -- as in Afghanistan, to some extent in Iran and Syria and, until recently, in Pakistan.

Even ostensibly friendly countries that have been cooperating with the United States on general strategy, such as Saudi Arabia, sometimes make a tacit bargain with terrorists so long as terrorist actions are not directed against the host government.

A serious anti-terrorism campaign must break this nexus.

Many of the host governments know more than they were prepar ed to communicate before Sept. 11. Incentives must be created for the sharing of intelligence.

The anti-terrorism campaign must improve security cooperation, interrupt the flow of funds, harass terrorist communications and subject the countries that provide safe haven to pressures including, in the extreme case, military pressure.

In the aftermath of the attack on American soil, the Bush administration resisted arguments urging immediate military action against known terrorist centres.

Instead, Secretary of State Colin Powell very skillfully brought about a global coalition that legitimised the use of military power against Afghanistan, the most flagrant provider of a safe haven for the most egregious symbol of international terrorism, Osama bin Laden.

The strategy of focusing on Afghanistan carries with it two risks, however.

The first is that the inherent complexities of a trackless geography and chaotic political system may divert the coalition from the ultimate objective of crippling international terrorism.

Though the elimination of bin Laden and his network and associates will be a significant symbolic achievement, it will be only the opening engagement of what must be viewed as a continuing and relentless worldwide campaign.

The second challenge is to guard against the temptation to treat cooperation on Afghanistan as meeting the challenge and to use it as an alibi for avoiding the necessary succeeding phases.

This is why military operations in Afghanistan should be limited to the shattering of the Taliban and disintegration of the bin Laden network.

Using U.S. military forces for nation-building or pacifying the entire country would involve us in a quagmire comparable to what drained the Soviet Union.

The conventional wisdom of creating a broadly based coalition to govern Afghanistan is desirable but not encouraged by the historical record.

The likely -- perhaps optimum -- outcome is a central Kabul government of limited reach, with tribal autonomy prevailing in the various regions. This essential enterprise should be put under the aegis of the United Nations, with generous economic support from the United States and other advanced industrial countries.

A contact group could be created composed of Afghanistan's neighbours (minus Iraq), India, the United States and those NATO allies that participated in the military operations.

This would provide a mechanism to reintroduce Iran to the international system, provided it genuinely abandons its support of terrorism.

The crucial phase of America's anti-terrorism strategy will begin as the Afghanistan military campaign winds down, and its focus will have to be outside Afghanistan.

At that point, the coalition will come under strain. So far the issue of long-term goals has been avoided by the formula that members of the global coalition are free to choose the degree of their involvement.

A la carte coalition management worked well when membership required little more than affirming opposition to terrorism in principle. Its continued usefulness will depend on how coalition obligations are defined in the next phase.

Should the convoy move at the pace of the slowest ship or should some parts of it be able to sail by themselves?

If the former, the coalition effort will gradually be defined by the least-common-denominator compromises that killed the U.N. inspection system in Iraq and are on the verge of eliminating the U.N. sanctions against that country.

Alternatively, the coalition can be conceived as a group united by common objectives but permitting autonomous action by whatever consensus can be created -- or, in the extreme case, by the United States alone.

Those who argue for the widest possible coalition -- in other words, for a coalition veto -- often cite the experience of the Gulf War.

But the differences are significant. The Gulf War was triggered by a clear case of aggression that threatened Saudi Arabia, whose security has been deemed crucial by a bipartisan succession of American presidents.

The United States decided to undo Saddam's adventure in the few months available before the summer heat made large-scale ground operations impossible. Several hundred thousand American troops were dispatched before any attempt at coalition building was undertaken.

Since the United States would obviously act alone if necessary, participating in the coalition became the most effective means for influencing events.

The direction of the current coalition is more ambiguous. President Bush has frequently and forcefully emphasized that he is determined to press the anti-terrorism campaign beyond Afghanistan.

In due course he will supplement his policy pronouncements with specific proposals. That will be the point at which the scope of the operational coalition will become clear.

There could be disagreement on what constitutes a terrorist safe haven; what measures states should take to cut off the flow of funds; what penalties there are for noncompliance; in what manner, whether and by whom force should be used.

Just as, in the Gulf War, the pressures for American unilateral action provided the cement to bring a coalition together, so, in the anti-terrorism war, American determination and that of allies of comparable views are needed.

A firm strategy becomes all the more important as biological weapons appear to have entered the arsenals of terrorism. Preventive action is becoming imperative.

States known to possess such facilities and to have previously used them must be obliged to open themselves to strict, conclusive international inspections with obligatory enforcement mechanisms.

This applies particularly to Iraq, with its long history of threats to all its neighbours and the use of chemical weapons. The conditions of international support for a firm policy exist.

The attack on the United States has produced an extraordinary congruence of interests among the major powers. None wants to be vulnerable to shadowy groups that have emerged, from Southeast Asia to the edge of Europe. Few have the means to resist alone.

The NATO allies have ended the debate about whether, after the end of the Cold War, there is still a need for an Atlantic security structure.

Our Asian allies, Japan and Korea, being democratic and industrialised, share this conviction. India, profoundly threatened by domestic Islamic fundamentalism, has much to lose by abandoning a common course.

Russia perceives a common interest due to its contiguous Islamic southern regions.

China shares a similar concern with respect to its western regions and has an added incentive to bring an end to global terrorism well before the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.

Paradoxically, terrorism has evoked a sense of world community that has eluded theoretical pleas for world order.

In the Islamic world, attitudes are more ambiguous. Many Islamic nations, though deeply concerned about fundamentalism, are constrained by their public opinion from avowing public support, and a few may sympathise with some aspects of the terrorist agenda.

An understanding American attitude toward traditional friends of America, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, is appropriate.

Their leaders are quite well aware that they have made compromises imposed on them by brutal domestic necessities.

The administration clearly should make every effort to help them overcome these circumstances, to improve intelligence sharing and the control of money flows.

But it must not undermine these governments, for in the short term, any foreseeable alternative would be worse for our interests and for the peoples involved.

Yet there are limits beyond which a serious policy cannot go. There is no reason for treating as members of the coalition countries whose state- supported media advocate and justify terrorism, withhold intelligence vital to the security of potential victims and permit terrorist groups to operate from their territory.

These considerations apply especially to Iran. Geopolitics argues for improved U.S.-Iranian relations. To welcome Iran into an anti-terrorism coalition has as a prerequisite the abandonment of its current role as the leading supporter of global terrorism as both the State Department and the bipartisan Bremer Commission have reported.

An Iranian relationship with the West can prosper only when both sides feel the need for it. Both sides -- and not only the West -- must make fundamental choices.

The same is true to a somewhat lesser degree of Syria. The war on terrorism is not just about hunting down terrorists. It is, above all, to protect the extraordinary opportunity that has come about to recast the international system.

The North Atlantic nations, having understood their common dangers, can turn to a new definition of common purposes.
Relations with former adversaries can go beyond liquidating the vestiges of the Cold War and find a new role for Russia in its post-imperial phase, and for China as it emerges into great power status.

India is emerging as an important global player. After measurable success in the anti-terrorism campaign, when it does not appear as concession to the terrorists, the Middle East peace process should be urgently resumed.

These and other prospects must not be allowed to vanish because those that have the ability to prevail shrink from what their opportunities require.

(The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm. This article was featured in The Washington Post on Nov 6, 2001)