Monday, 29-Sep-2003 10:02 AM

Tawan Kedah: Pipedream or pipeline?

Is the opposition’s plan to wrest Kedah, the third state that would then come under opposition control, a pipedream or is it in the pipeline? Political analysts say that 1999, the year of the Tenth General Elections, was the opposition’s best ever performance. The opposition, they say, rode on the back of the Reformasi wave, and Reformasi is now dead, so the 1999 performance cannot be repeated. From hereon, say the sceptics, it is downhill for the opposition.

Is this so? Let us look at some stark realities before we write-off the opposition’s chances of bettering its 1999 performance.

When Parti Keadilan Nasional (keADILan) faced the 1999 general election, it was but a mere seven months old. For a seven-month old political party, wining five Parliament and five state seats was no small feat. No doubt many expected keADILan to do better than that, but one must also look at the percentage of votes garnered, not just seats won, to properly assess the party’s performance.

KeADILan actually garnered 11.5% of the total votes cast. Some say this is worse than Semangat 46 (Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah's Umno breakaway party) that garnered 15.1% of the votes when it faced its maiden election in 1990. However, one has to remember, Semangat 46 had three years to prepare itself while keADILan was given just seven months. Further to that, in the constituencies that Semangat 46 contested, it managed only 29% of the votes while keADILan garnered 39.3%. This means keADILan actually did better and not worse than Semangat 46 as many try to make us believe.

The Democratic Action Party's (DAP) best election was 1986 when it won 24 Parliament seats. Ironically, this was also the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party's (PAS) worse election when it was reduced to only one seat. In 1990, DAP dropped to 20 seats while the PAS-Semangat 46 coalition shared 15 seats between them. They also managed to win one state, Kelantan.

They say, after that, the opposition’s fortunes declined as DAP dropped to nine seats and PAS-Semangat 46 dropped to 13 seats in the 1995 election though the opposition still retained Kelantan.

The impression we get here is that 1990 was a high point for the opposition, 1995 was a low point, and 1999 was another high point. Therefore, the next election, logically speaking, should be another low point for the opposition in compliance with the yo-yo or seesaw theory

But this is not what the popular votes garnered by the opposition in these three elections show.

Let us first look at Kelantan, the state that has been under opposition control for the last three elections and which the opposition is confident it can retain in the next election.

In 1990, Umno (the dominant partner in the ruling coalition) managed only 32% of the votes in Kelantan. In 1995, Umno’s votes increased to 43% but it still failed to win back the state. In 1999, Umno garnered 37% of the votes and still failed to win back the state. Umno would have to win more than 60% of the votes in Kelantan to be able to knock the opposition out of office and this is something it could never do. Even in the so-called ‘best’ election in 1995, Umno managed only 43% of the votes and failed miserably to knock the opposition out.

Now let us look at Terengganu, a state that has been under the opposition for only one election and which Umno is confident of winning back the next time around.

In 1990, Umno won 64% of the popular votes in Terengganu, double the 32% it garnered in Kelantan. However, while Umno improved slightly in Kelantan in 1995 (43%), in Terengganu, Umno’s votes declined to 55%, though it still managed to retain the state. This means Umno’s performance DID NOT improve in Terengganu in 1995 as what many believe. In 1999, Umno’ performance declined further to 41% and it lost the state to the opposition. This means Umno’s performance did not yo-yo or seesaw like it did in Kelantan but has been steadily declining over three elections.

If one can argue that Semangat 46 was the factor in 1990, and Reformasi in 1999, what then was the reason for Umno’s declining performance in Terengganu in 1995? The only logical explanation is that PAS had been slowly making inroads all those years and was chipping away at Umno’s fortress piece by piece. There is every reason to believe Umno’s downtrend, that has been consistent all these years, would continue into the next election.

Umno needed 64% of the votes in 1990 to keep Terengganu. In 1999, at 41%, it lost the state. Umno, therefore, would need to improve its performance by 50% to kick the opposition out. And this would be quite difficult. 5% or 10% maybe, but not 50%, and, without 50%, it does not have a snowball’s chance in hell of winning back the state.

Now let us go to Kedah, the third state the opposition is eyeing.

In 1990, Umno garnered 61% of the Kedah votes and demolished the opposition. In 1995, Umno’s votes declined to 59%. In 1999, it declined further to 50% resulting in the ruling coalition losing more than half its Parliament seats -- eight out of 15 -- and one-third of its seats in the State Assembly; 12 out of 36. Umno in Kedah seems to be consistent with the steady declining trend of Umno in Terengganu. If the opposition had grabbed another 10% of the votes, reducing Umno to roughly 40%, Kedah would certainly have been that third state under opposition control.

Kedah could have fallen to the opposition in 1999

Could Kedah have been that third state to come under opposition control in 1999? Quite possible, as the results of the last election shows. (Full details of the Kedah 1999 election results).

In 1999, the ruling party garnered only 40% of the votes in Kedah based on a 75% voter turnout while the opposition managed 33%. This means the difference was not that great and all the opposition needed to do was to swing about 6% of the voters to grab the state -- or persuade another 10% of its supporters to come out and vote.

Could the opposition have done this?

The opposition won 12 of the 36 State Assembly seats and eight of the 15 Parliament seats, more than half. In the Lunas by-election exactly one year later, the opposition won another state thereby denying the ruling party its two-thirds majority in the State Assembly.

In terms of popular votes, the opposition won 45% of the votes cast while the ruling party won 55%, so a 6% swing in favour of the opposition would have been very significant.

The opposition would have needed seven more state seats to form the State government with a simple majority. Where could these seven seats have come from?

Kota Seputeh is one. BN won by only 1%.

Tanjong Seri is another. BN won by less than 2%

In Pantai Merdeka BN won by 2%

The seats where BN won by 10% or less are:

Kubang Rotan – 10%

Sungai Tiang – 10%

Tanjong Dawai – 10%

Bayu – 10%

Bandar Baharu – 8%

And all this makes eight seats, not including Lunas, which is now under the opposition. Therefore, the opposition was not too far off winning the state.

But, of course, this can also go the other way. In the seats the opposition won, the win too was very narrow, even worse than BN’s narrow win in the seats it won. So, chances are, BN can win back these seats instead. This means the opposition cannot rest on its laurels and assume that it could do better the next time around when the opposite could instead happen.

And the fact that Kedah was carved up in the last delineation exercise makes this a real worry.

How will the opposition fare in the other states?

Pahang too is another state that could fall to the opposition, if not the coming election then at least the one after that.

In 1990, Umno managed 73% of the votes in Pahang. In 1995, it dropped to 69% and, in 1999, dropped further to 53%. Pahang is almost at the level of Kedah and probably, at worse, the opposition could deny the ruling party its two-thirds majority in the State Assembly come next election just like it did Kedah. And, remember, in 1995 it was not because of Semangat 46 or Reformasi.

The opposition also has its sights on Selangor. Winning Selangor could actually be quite possible as this state was Umno’s worse performer in terms of decline. In 1995, Umno garnered 82% of the votes in Selangor, only slightly surpassed by Umno’s fortresses of Johor, Negeri Sembilan and Melaka that saw 86-87%. However, in 1999, Umno’s votes in Selangor dropped to only 51%, almost as bad as Kedah, a decline of a whooping 31%. Certainly, Selangor is far from a pipedream but could, just like Kedah and Pahang, be in the pipeline.

Malaysia’s racial voting pattern

PAS did very well in the Malay majority constituencies while DAP sailed through in the Chinese majority areas. Those mixed constituencies were where the opposition was slaughtered and, unfortunately, these were the seats that keADILan was given to contest.

However, don’t get me wrong, keADILan was not quite slaughtered. Though it was only seven months old then, it still managed to garner 39.3% of the votes in the seats it contested and 11.5% of the total popular votes. This is certainly no small feat and should be recognised as an impressive achievement notwithstanding the lesser number of seats it won.

DAP won five seats (half the ten seats it won) in constituencies that had more than 80% Chinese voters. BN won only one seat. Where the Chinese voters dropped to 70-80%, DAP won only one seat while BN won three. In the 60-70% Chinese voters seats, surprisingly, DAP won three seats leaving BN the other three. But even DAP admits this is because, for the first time in Malaysian election history, the Malays voted for them if not they would have lost these three seats as well.

This shows DAP depends very much on the Chinese voters and can perform well in seats that have Chinese majorities. Of course, the government knows this as well and, in the latest delineation exercise, the Chinese majority constituencies were carved up so that there would be very little seats left that have more than 80% Chinese voters. This means, for DAP to make it, it would have to depend on the Malay voters, more so now than before.

PAS and keADILan too depends on the Malay voters. It won 21 seats where the Malays represent more than 90% of the voters, basically in the East Coast states of Peninsular Malaysia. Where the Malay voters were between 80-90%, PAS-keADILan won only seven seats while BN won eight seats. As the Malay voters reduced to 60-70%, PAS-keADILan were almost demolished -- winning only four seats. In the 50-50 seats, ALL the opposition parties were massacred and BN won ALL the seats.

As mentioned earlier, the latest delineation exercise was to carve away these Malay or Chinese 80-90% majority seats and make them more “mixed”. This would make it more difficult for the opposition unless they move away from the racial voting pattern. If any party were seen as a Malay or Chinese party, then BN would sail through. If, however, the voters accept them as non-racial parties, then they may do better.

The opposition must accept the fact that race-based politics is a thing of the past. BN won because it is seen as a non-racial coalition. And it will continue to win as more and more constituencies become less slanted towards any particular ethnic group, thanks to the recent delineation exercise.

And this is where keADILan will have to come in. But, to expect keADILan to take all the 50-50 seats while PAS and DAP monopolise the Malay or Chinese majority seats is unfair. KeADILan should also be given some of those Malay or Chinese majority seats while DAP and PAS should take some of the 50-50 seats and try to convince the voters that they too are non-racial.

But this would require an attitude change by both PAS and DAP and they would have to stop making statements or doing things that would give the voters an impression they are only out to serve their own community.

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